Enclosure of the Oceans versus the Common Heritage of Mankind: The Inherent Tension between the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles and the Area by Lodge, Michael W.
  
 











The Charles H. Stockton  
Distinguished Essay: 
 
Enclosure of the Oceans versus the 
Common Heritage of Mankind:  
The Inherent Tension between the 
Continental Shelf Beyond  


























The Charles H. Stockton  
Distinguished Essay: 
 
Enclosure of the Oceans versus the  
Common Heritage of Mankind:  
The Inherent Tension between the  
Continental Shelf Beyond  
200 Nautical Miles and the Area 
 
 






I. Introduction ............................................................................................. 804 
II. Determining the Limits of the Area ..................................................... 808 
III. Rio Grande Rise ...................................................................................... 815 
IV. Okinotorishima ....................................................................................... 818 
V. Arctic ........................................................................................................ 823 
VI. The Unfinished Business of Article 82 ................................................ 826 






∗ Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those 














     he 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 
is rightly regarded as a major achievement of diplomacy in the late twentieth 
century.2 It has been variously described as the “constitution for the ocean”3 
and “the most far reaching and complex conventional undertaking” of the 
United Nations since the adoption of the UN Charter itself in 1945.4 Its 
adoption in New York in April 1982 marked the culmination of the longest-
running negotiation in the history of the UN. It also set a record in the his-
tory of international law when it was signed by 119 States on December 10, 
1982, in Montego Bay, Jamaica, the first day on which it was opened for 
signature. 
As a multilateral conference, the third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was unrivaled in its scope and ambition, 
covering some twenty-five disparate topics and issues reflecting every aspect 
of the uses of the ocean and its resources. Certainly, the monumental nature 
of UNCLOS is striking—it consists of no less than 320 articles and 9 an-
nexes.  
Almost forty years later, UNCLOS has withstood the test of time. It now 
has 168 parties, including nearly all the major maritime powers except for 
the United States. This is a remarkable achievement when one considers that 
when it entered into force in 1994 only one of the sixty States that had rati-
fied UNCLOS was not a developing country.5 There can be no doubt that 
 
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
2. David H. Anderson, Islands and Rocks in the Modern Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE 
SEA CONVENTION: US ACCESSION AND GLOBALIZATION 307 (Myron Nordquist et al. eds., 
2012). 
3. Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Remarks at the Final Session of the Conference: A Constitution for the Oceans 
(Dec. 11, 1982), reprinted in THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE U.N. CONVEN-
TION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, at xxxiv (1983). 
4. Patrick Robinson, The International Seabed Authority at Twenty-Five: The Status of the UN-
CLOS Notion of the Common Heritage of Mankind under International Law, in THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PART XI REGIME AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY: A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR JOURNEY (forthcoming 2021). 
5. Shabtai Rosenne, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, 29 ISRAEL 













the main substantive provisions of UNCLOS may now be regarded as cus-
tomary international law.6 The institutions created by UNCLOS are well es-
tablished and supported by States parties. Even in respect of those provi-
sions of UNCLOS that do not represent customary international law, such 
as the deep seabed mining provisions in Part XI and Annex III, there have 
been no unilateral claims outside the regime established by UNCLOS.  
Experience has shown that UNCLOS is adaptable, as well as resilient. 
This is best demonstrated by the two implementing agreements of 1994 and 
1995 on deep seabed mining7 and high seas fisheries,8 respectively. What is 
particularly significant is that these agreements develop the provisions of 
UNCLOS in the light of new scientific knowledge and growing environmen-
tal concerns without undermining the underlying package of rights and ju-
risdictions agreed in 1982. 
The bodies established by UNCLOS have also been used creatively to 
make additions, interpretations, and subtle changes to the law of the sea. For 
example, the meeting of States parties has been utilized to derogate certain 
provisions relating to the submission of applications to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).9 The International Seabed Au-
thority (ISA) has introduced regulations governing access to mineral re-
sources that had not even been discovered when UNCLOS was negotiated 
 
6. David Freestone, The Law of the Sea Convention at 30: Successes, Challenges and New Agen-
das, 27 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 3 (2013). 
7. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3. 
8. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Man-
agement of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 
4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001). 
9. The decision by the Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS to allow the submission 
of preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles to satisfy the ten-year time period referred to in Article 4 of Annex II of 
UNCLOS. See Meeting of States Parties, Decision Regarding the Workload of the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Ability of States, Particularly Developing States, to Fulfil the 
Requirements of Article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well 












in the late 1970s.10 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (IT-
LOS) has also demonstrated its willingness to clarify and interpret the law in 
line with progressive environmental concepts such as the precautionary ap-
proach.11 
Yet despite its many achievements and undoubted success, there is a 
deep-seated underlying tension that continues to exist at the heart of UN-
CLOS. This tension lies between the delineation of the continental shelf be-
yond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of UNCLOS and the delineation of 
the extent of the Area as defined in Article 1(1). So far, this tension has not 
manifested itself in the form of disputes. Nevertheless, as activities in the 
Area12 expand and advances in marine survey technology reveal a more com-
plex seabed morphology than was understood in 1982, leading to more ex-
pansive claims to national jurisdiction, the possibility exists that two funda-
mentally different approaches—the exclusivity of coastal State jurisdiction 
versus the international character and shared space of the Area—are set on 
a collision course that may challenge one of the basic underlying foundations 
of UNCLOS. 
This tension manifests itself in at least three ways, which will be explored 
in the following Parts of this essay. First, there is the problem of determining 
the limits of the Area itself, and hence the jurisdiction of the ISA. Second, 
there is the problem of dealing with potential disputes over the delineation 
or delimitation of the continental shelf and the spillover consequences of 
 
10. In drafting Part XI and Annex III of UNCLOS, UNCLOS III negotiators consid-
ered only polymetallic (manganese) nodules. No consideration was given to other hard min-
eral resources in the deep sea, including polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanga-
nese crusts. ISA has since regulated exploration for such resources. Assembly, International 
Seabed Authority, Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Reg-
ulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area, ISA Doc. 
ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1 (Nov. 15, 2001), https://isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/isba-16 
a-12rev1_0.pdf; Assembly, International Seabed Authority, Decision of the Assembly of the In-
ternational Seabed Authority relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich 
Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area, ISA Doc. ISBA/18/A/11 (Oct. 22, 2012), https://isa. 
org.jm/files/files/documents/isba-18a-11_0.pdf [hereinafter ISA Assembly Decision on 
Regulations].   
11. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of February 1, 2011, 11 
ITLOS Rep. 10, 45–47, 75. 
12. “Activities in the Area” is a term of art defined as “all activities of exploration for, 
and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.” UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 1(3). “Re-
sources” are defined as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at 











those disputes. Third, there is the unfinished business of implementing the 
revenue-sharing provisions of Article 82 of UNCLOS. 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of UNCLOS was to replace a plethora 
of conflicting and competing claims by coastal States with universally agreed 
limits on the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the exclusive economic 
zone, as well as clarity on the rights and duties of coastal States within those 
zones. The regime for these zones was supported by a complex regime of 
baseline delineation, intended to ensure consistency and discourage exces-
sive claims. The overriding community interest in freedom of navigation was 
ensured through agreement on the status of the exclusive economic zone 
and special rules governing innocent passage through the territorial sea and 
transit passage through straits used for international navigation. A new legal 
regime was created for archipelagic States, allowing for establishment of ar-
chipelagic baselines, but at the same time facilitating free navigation through 
archipelagic sea lanes. Land-locked States were assured of perpetual rights of 
access to and from the sea as well as a share in common resources.  
With respect to the continental shelf, UNCLOS restated in Articles 76(1) 
and 77(3) the rights of the coastal State in customary international law over 
the adjacent shelf.13 It also appeared to settle the vexed question of the de-
termination of the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles. It did this by devising a formula set out in Article 7614 combining the 
“influences of geography, geology, geomorphology and jurisprudence”15 and 
adding a procedural mechanism—the CLCS—to assist States in applying this 
formula in a uniform and consistent manner.  
At the same time, in Part XI and its associated annexes, UNCLOS es-
tablished an entirely novel legal regime for management of the largest un-
tapped mineral resource on the planet by designating the seabed beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction (referred to as “the Area”) and its associated 
 
13. Ted L. McDorman, The Continental Shelf, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 181 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015). 
14. The geomorphological basis of the formula is further elaborated in scientific and 
technical guidelines published by the CLCS. See Commission on the Limits of the Conti-
nental Shelf, Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission for the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, U.N. Doc. CLCS/11 (May 13, 1999), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/GEN/N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf; Commission on the Limits of the Conti-
nental Shelf, Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission for the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, U.N. Doc. CLCS/11/Add.1/Corr.1 (Nov. 19, 1999), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/356/61/IMG/N9935661.pdf. 












mineral resources as the “common heritage of mankind.”16 The Area and its 
resources would be managed by an international agency (the International 
Seabed Authority) specially created for that purpose. The mineral resources 
must be used for the benefit of all humanity, but access to the resources is 
assured to both developed and developing States, rich or poor, large or small, 
coastal or landlocked. 
 
II. DETERMINING THE LIMITS OF THE AREA 
 
From the outset of UNCLOS III in 1974, the issue of the extent of the con-
tinental shelf was divisive. On the one hand, the broad margin States saw an 
opportunity to advance extended shelf claims that would not have been ac-
cepted in a purely unilateral context and thereby to capture potential hydro-
carbon resources for the benefit of coastal States. On the other hand, there 
was a deep-seated suspicion by many developing countries that the conti-
nental shelf regime reflected in the 1958 Convention had primarily served 
the interests of developed States and that this should be rectified.17 The land-
locked and geographically disadvantaged States, in particular, considered it 
essential to create an “economically meaningful international area” with 
enough resources to be shared by all States.18 
It is important here to recall that, while UNCLOS as a whole represented 
a “package deal,” several of the key aspects were negotiated in isolation of 
one another, only converging at the end of UNCLOS III, or even in the 
drafting committee. This is particularly true for the regime for the Area, in 
Part XI and Annex III of the Convention, which was dealt with in the First 
Committee at UNCLOS III, and the regime for the continental shelf, which 
was dealt with by the Second Committee and in specialized negotiating 
groups.19  
 
16. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 136.  
17. See Michael W. Lodge, The International Seabed Authority and Article 82 of the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, 21 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 
323 (2006). 
18. 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMEN-
TARY 844–45 (Satya N. Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne & Neal R. Grandy eds., 1993) [hereinafter 
UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY]; Helmut Tuerk, Questions Relating to the Continental Shelf 
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Delimitation, Delineation, and Revenue-Sharing, 97 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 232, 234 (2021). 
19. Particularly significant work was done by Negotiating Group 6 (NG6) chaired by 
Andres Aguilar (Venezuela) and the Informal Group of Juridical Experts (the Evenson 











As a result, the relationship between the Area and the continental shelf 
is a complex one. Whereas UNCLOS defines the maritime zones pertaining 
to the national jurisdiction of coastal States by reference to objective criteria, 
such as baselines or, in the case of the continental shelf, by reference to cri-
teria set out in Article 76, it defines the extent of the Area only by reference 
to what it is not. The Area is thus defined as “the seabed and ocean floor 
and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”20 The only 
way the boundary of the Area can be delineated, therefore, is to first establish 
the limits of national jurisdiction. In the case of the exclusive economic zone, 
this is relatively straightforward, at least in the case of those States parties to 
the Convention that have already declared their maritime zones.21  
In the case of the continental shelf, however, while coastal State jurisdic-
tion of 200 nautical miles can be assumed, the situation is far from straight-
forward in the case of those States having claims to continental shelves ex-
tending beyond 200 nautical miles. Several practical problems arise, both for 
the ISA and for concerned coastal States. An overriding problem is the slow 
progress in the work of the CLCS, which means that the delineation of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf is likely to take many years. This is caused 
by two main factors.  
First, during UNCLOS III, it was estimated that no more than thirty-five 
States would be able to claim an entitlement to a continental shelf extending 
beyond 200 nautical miles on the basis of Article 76. This was a significant 
underestimate. As of March 31, 2020, the CLCS had received a total of 
ninety-two submissions, including seven revised submissions, from seventy-
one States parties, either individually or jointly.22 As of the same date, the 
CLCS had issued thirty-five sets of recommendations, including for four re-
vised submissions. Meanwhile, according to the chair of the CLCS, the wait-
ing time between the making of a submission and the establishment of a 
subcommission has increased to approximately eleven years and is expected 
 
20. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
21. As of March 31, 2020, forty-four States parties had deposited information concern-
ing the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone with the UN Secretary-General. DIVI-
SION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, UNITED 
NATIONS, LAW OF THE SEA: BULLETIN NO. 103, at 28, ¶ 12 (2020), https://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/LOSBulletin103-WEB.pdf. 
22. See Letter from Adman Rashid Nasser Al-Azri, Chair, Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf, to the President of the Thirtieth Meeting of States Parties ¶ 10, 











to increase further.23 With at least forty-six submissions left to be considered, 
the work of the CLCS could well continue to the middle of the century. 
Second, and related to the first, is the fact that the UNCLOS negotiators, 
since they did not foresee the large number of submissions, did not make 
adequate provision for the work of the CLCS.24 Unlike ITLOS and ISA, 
which were established as permanent institutions with autonomous budgets 
and appropriate governance structures, the CLCS was established as a body 
of experts to be elected by the States parties every five years, having due 
regard to the need to ensure equitable geographic representation.25 Member-
ship in the CLCS is not a full-time job, and members are expected to com-
bine frequent and lengthy meetings of the CLCS in New York with their 
regular professional commitments. The CLCS has no budget and the States 
parties that nominated the members have the responsibility to defray the 
expenses of those members while in performance of CLCS duties.26 This 
situation has created many difficulties, especially in terms of ensuring the 
participation of members of the CLCS from developing States. Although the 
States parties had created a voluntary trust fund for facilitating the participa-
tion of members of the Commission from developing States in the meetings 
of the Commission,27 the issue of the working conditions of the CLCS has 
been under discussion by the Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS for sev-
eral years.28 A further exacerbating factor, as reported by the current chair of 
the CLCS is that “improvements in science and technology, coupled with 
deeper knowledge of continental shelf areas, has increased the complexity of 
submissions, requiring more time and analysis by the Commission.”29 
The end result is that, notwithstanding the fact that thirty-five recom-
mendations have been issued by the CLCS, only nine States have so far ful-
filled their obligation under Article 84(2) to deposit charts or lists of geo-
graphical coordinates showing the outer limits of the continental shelf with 
 
23. Id. ¶ 11. 
24. Helmut Tuerk, The Common Heritage of Mankind After 50 Years, 57 INDIAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (2017). 
25. UNCLOS, supra note 1, annex II, art. 1(1). 
26. Id. annex II, art. 1(5). 
27. G.A. Res. 55/7 (Oct. 30, 2000), https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/55/7. 
28. See Meeting of States Parties, Note by the Secretariat, Options to Address the Working 
Conditions of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/30/11 (Apr. 
24, 2020), https://undocs.org/SPLOS/30/11. 











the Secretary-General of ISA.30 These nine States are Australia, Croatia, 
France (concerning Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana, La Reunion, New 
Caledonia, St Paul and Amsterdam, and the Kerguelen islands), Ireland, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Niue, Pakistan, and the Philippines. It is important to 
note that, as Article 84(2) makes no distinction as to whether the outer limits 
it refers to are in relation to the shelf up to or beyond 200 nautical miles, it 
is necessary for all coastal States to deposit information concerning the outer 
limits so that the extent of the Area can be known with accuracy. 
A further problem concerns the position of States that are not yet parties 
to UNCLOS. Two related questions arise. First, are such States entitled to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and, if so, are they also subject 
to the related obligations set out in UNCLOS? While it seems clear that the 
entitlement to a continental shelf in paragraph 1 of Article 76 is part of cus-
tomary international law,31 it is less clear that the detailed provisions and re-
lated obligations set out in paragraphs 2–7 also have the status of customary 
international law (even though the delineation of the outer limit of the con-
tinental shelf depends entirely on the establishment of the outer edge of the 
continental margin, which is defined in paragraph 3). The International 
Court of Justice, in Nicaragua v. Colombia, stated that “it does not need to 
decide” whether the detailed provisions of Article 76 form part of customary 
international law.32  
On the other hand, ITLOS, in the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case, considered 
that paragraph 1 of Article 76 “should be understood in light of the subse-
quent provisions of the Article defining the continental shelf and the conti-
nental margin.”33 In respect of the United States, some authors have sug-
gested that a claim to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles could be 
 
30. Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, Report under Article 166, 
Paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ¶ 7, ISA Doc. ISBA/24/A/2 
(May 29, 2018). See also President of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority, 
Statement on the Work of the Assembly at its Twenty-fourth Session, ¶¶ 9, 14, ISA Doc. 
ISBA/24/A/12 (Aug. 10, 2018); Charts and Lists of Geographical Coordinates, INTERNATIONAL 
SEABED AUTHORITY, https://isa.org.jm/deposit-charts (last visited Apr. 23, 2021).  
31. The International Court of Justice stated in the Nicaragua v. Colombia judgment that 
it considers the entirety of Article 76(1) to be “part of customary international law.” Terri-
torial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 624, ¶ 118 (Nov. 19) 
[hereinafter Nicaragua v. Colombia]. 
32. Id. 
33. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the 
Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case. No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, 12 ITLOS Rep. 











made based on customary international law34 as reflected in the Truman 
Declaration35 and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.36 
According to this view, while nothing in UNCLOS prohibits the United 
States from making a submission to the CLCS, notwithstanding its status as 
a non-party to UNCLOS, it is not obliged to do so in order to benefit from 
customary international law.37 It is also unclear whether non-parties would 
be bound by the provisions of Article 84(2), although one presumes that it 
could only be in their interests to deposit information on the outer limits of 
their continental shelves with both the United Nations and ISA. 
The outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles es-
tablished by the coastal State become “final and binding” if they are adopted 
“on the basis of” the recommendations of the CLCS.38 What “final and bind-
ing” means in this context has been subject to some academic debate,39 but 
it seems clear that the limits so established would be binding on other States 
parties as well as the ISA. As far as the ISA is concerned, UNCLOS gives 
the ISA no role at all in the process before the CLCS,40 despite the fact that 
the Area is directly affected by the delineation of the continental shelf be-
yond 200 nautical miles. Indeed, the possibility for the ISA to intervene be-
fore what was then envisaged as the Continental Shelf Boundary Commis-
sion was rejected during the negotiation of UNCLOS.41 Furthermore, Article 
134(4) of UNCLOS, which deals with the scope of Part XI, provides that 
nothing in that article affects the establishment of the outer limits of the 
 
34. See, e.g., Raul Pedrozo, Is it Time for the United States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention?, 
41 JOURNAL OF MARITIME LAW AND COMMERCE 151 (2010). 
35. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil 
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 
28, 1945). 
36. Convention of the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. 
37. Pedrozo, supra note 34. 
38. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 76(8). 
39. The argument has been made that it does not apply to third States and the interna-
tional community as neither of these groups is a party to the submission process. See SU-
ZETTE V. SUAREZ, THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
THEIR ESTABLISHMENT 239 (2008).  
40. Michael W. Lodge, Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, Re-
marks at the Open Meeting of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: The 
Relevance and Importance of the Work of the Commission to the International Seabed 
Authority (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/documents/Presen-
tations/6_CLCS_20_ANNIVERSARY_Lodge.pdf. 











continental shelf in accordance with Part VI, implying that the Area itself is 
a residual space, comprising only what is left over after coastal States have 
taken their share. According to this theory, the presumption is in favor of 
coastal State jurisdiction. 
The rules and practice of the CLCS, on the other hand, do provide lim-
ited avenues for affected coastal States to intervene prior to the CLCS issuing 
a recommendation, albeit with not particularly satisfactory outcomes for the 
ISA. Under the rules of procedure of the CLCS,42 the coastal State must, 
when making its submission, inform the CLCS of any dispute relating to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf or of any unresolved land or maritime 
dispute related to the submission.43 The practice has been for affected States 
to quickly notify the CLCS where disputes exist and to raise explicit objec-
tions to the whole or part of submissions in such cases. In cases where a land 
or maritime dispute exists, the CLCS shall not consider and qualify a sub-
mission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute.44 However, it 
may consider one or more submissions in the areas under dispute with prior 
consent given by all States that are parties to such a dispute or it may, and 
on several occasions has, encouraged the coastal State to make a partial sub-
mission that excludes the area in dispute. This is no doubt a logical way to 
proceed given that the CLCS is not, and was never intended to be, a mech-
anism for settlement of disputes. Such disputes over delimitation between 
opposite or adjacent States may instead be considered within the framework 
of the dispute settlement provisions under UNCLOS. The problem, of 
course, is that until the dispute is settled, we have no outcome as far as the 
delineation or delimitation of the area under dispute is concerned and are no 
closer to determining the limits of the Area. 
A grey area exists in relation to information submitted by third States 
that does not amount to information regarding a dispute related to the sub-
mission. This was the case in relation to the first submission to the CLCS 
made by Brazil in 2004. The United States, on that occasion, submitted a 
letter drawing attention to certain technical issues in relation to the submis-
sion. The CLCS declined to consider the U.S. comments on the grounds that 
“other States” can play “only one role” with regard to the consideration of 
 
42. See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1 (Apr. 17, 
2008), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/309/23/PDF/N083 
0923.pdf. 
43. Id. annex I, ¶ 2(a). 











material submitted by the coastal State, namely in the case of a dispute as 
referred to in Annex I, paragraph 2(a) of the rules of procedure of the 
CLCS.45 Noting that neither Annex II of UNCLOS nor the rules of proce-
dure of the CLCS specifically prohibited the CLCS from considering such 
communications, the United States, in response, pointed to the reference in 
Annex III, paragraph 2(a)(v) of the rules to consideration of “[c]omments 
on any note verbale from other States regarding the data reflected in the 
executive summary.” The rules on the matter are not particularly clear,46 alt-
hough one would assume that it would be in the interest of the CLCS to 
obtain as much information as possible regarding a continental shelf entitle-
ment claimed by a coastal State in order to be able to render the most objec-
tive recommendation possible.  
Notwithstanding, a number of submissions have attracted observations 
of other States on matters not related to disputes. These have not prevented 
the CLCS from proceeding to issue recommendations, even though it is not 
clear whether the CLCS was swayed by those observations.47 The procedure 
does offer a potential, albeit narrowly circumscribed, route for States to chal-
lenge submissions on technical grounds.  
In the case of disagreement by the submitting coastal State with the rec-
ommendations of the CLCS, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, 
make a revised or new submission.48 At least seven fully or partially revised 
submissions have been made.49 The CLCS has decided that revised submis-
sions will be considered on a priority basis notwithstanding the queue50 and 
 
45. See Alex G. Oude Elferink, Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf and Disputed Areas: State 
Practice Concerning Article 76(10) of the LOS Convention, 21 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MA-
RINE AND COASTAL LAW 461 (2006). 
46. Id. at 474 n.56. 
47. For example, the United States made observations on the submissions by Brazil 
and the Russian Federation. Japan made observations on the submission of the Russian 
Federation concerning the Sea of Okhotsk. In all instances, the State making observations 
did not object to the consideration of the submission. See id. at 486. 
48. UNCLOS, supra note 1, annex II, art. 8. 
49. Russian Federation (two partial revised submissions), Brazil (three partial revised 
submissions), Barbados (one revised submission), Argentina (one partial revised submis-
sion). Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf, Pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, U.N. OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, https://www. 
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2021). 
50. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairperson of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, ¶ 57, 











these have duly taken their place at the front of the growing queue of sub-
missions.  
The application of these processes in practice and their potential impli-
cations for ISA may be seen in three examples. These will suffice to show 
the difficulties that could arise for ISA from uncertainty over the delineation 
or delimitation of the continental shelf and thus lack of clarity as to the limits 
of the Area. The first example concerns the Rio Grande Rise, off the coast 
of Brazil, where a contract for exploration has already been granted by ISA 
over an area which has been later identified as forming part of the continen-
tal shelf of a State. The second example concerns the situation where there 
is a dispute over the status of the relevant maritime space and whether the 
provisions of UNCLOS have been properly applied. And the third example 
concerns a situation where there are multiple overlapping continental shelf 
submissions and uncertainty over whether part of the region in question be-
longs to the Area. 
 
III. RIO GRANDE RISE 
 
An interesting illustration of the complexities that may arise can be seen in 
the case of the Rio Grande Rise. On December 31, 2013, Companhia de 
Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais (CPRM), a Brazilian state corporation, ap-
plied for approval of a plan of work for exploration for cobalt-rich ferro-
manganese crusts to ISA, in accordance with the ISA’s Regulations on Pro-
specting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the 
Area.51 The ISA Council, acting on the recommendation of the Legal and 
Technical Commission,52 recommended the approval of the plan of work 
for exploration,53 and an exploration contract between ISA and CPRM was 
signed on November 9, 2015. The contract is in force until November 8, 
2030.  
 
51. See generally ISA Assembly Decision on Regulations, supra note 10. 
52. International Seabed Authority, Council, Report and Recommendations of the Legal and 
Technical Commission to the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating to an Application for 
the Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts by Companhia 
de Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais, ISA Doc. ISBA/20/C/17 (July 9, 2014), https://isa.org.jm/ 
files/files/documents/isba-20c-17_0.pdf.  
53. International Seabed Authority, Council, Decision of the Council Relating to an Applica-
tion for the Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts by Com-












At the time the contract was entered into, it was acknowledged that the 
part of the Rio Grande Rise covered by the contract formed part of the Area. 
Indeed, Brazil had in 2004 made a submission to the CLCS pursuant to Ar-
ticle 76(8) of UNCLOS that did not include the Rio Grande Rise. The CLCS 
adopted its recommendations on the Brazilian submission on April 4, 2007.54 
However, after receiving the recommendations of the CLCS, instead of 
establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf on the basis of those 
recommendations, Brazil opted to make not one but three revised partial 
submissions in respect of different regions of the continental shelf.55 The 
third of these partial submissions, which was submitted on December 7, 
2018, covers the Brazilian Oriental and Meridional Margin56 and overlaps 
with the part of the Rio Grande Rise covered by the exploration contract 
between ISA and CPRM.  
As of January 2021, the partial revised submission has yet to be placed 
on the agenda of the CLCS, and it is not known when the submission will 
be presented to the plenary of the CLCS, let alone considered by a subcom-
mission. Nevertheless, on  February 25, 2019, during the twenty-fifth session 
of the ISA Council, the representative of Brazil delivered a statement in 
which he indicated that “the polygon and related coordinates of the Meridi-
onal Margin comprises the Rio Grande Rise as natural prolongation of Bra-
zil’s land territory, existing ipso facto and ab initio” pursuant to Articles 76, 77, 
and Annex II of UNCLOS.57 He also indicated that “Brazil is already taking 
necessary steps to officially and promptly notify the Secretary-General of the 
 
54. COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, SUMMARY OF THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
IN REGARD TO THE SUBMISSION MADE BY BRAZIL ON MAY 17, 2004 OF INFORMATION ON 
THE PROPOSED OUTER LIMITS OF ITS CONTINENTAL SHELF (2011), https://www.un. 
org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/bra04/Summary_Recommendations_Bra-
zil.pdf. See also Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman 
of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, ¶ 
22, U.N. Doc. CLCS/54 (Apr. 24, 2007), https://undocs.org/en/clcs/54. 
55. In the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommendations of the 
CLCS, “the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new submission.” 
UNCLOS, supra note 1, annex II, art. 8.   
56. BRAZILIAN CONTINENTAL SHELF SURVEY PROGRAM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
BRAZILIAN PARTIAL REVISED SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL SHELF (2018), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fil 
es/bra02_rev18/BR-OMM-ExecutiveSummary.pdf. 
57. Council, International Seabed Authority, 25th Sess. (pt. I), 246th mtg. (Feb. 25, 











ISA on the legal consequence of that submission over the present sponsor-
ship granted by Brazil and also on the necessary measures to be implemented 
accordingly.”58 
No such notification has been made, and no action has been taken by 
ISA, Brazil, as sponsoring State, or by the contractor, with respect to the 
contract. Indeed, in 2019 CPRM continued to submit its annual report on 
activities under the contract as required under the applicable ISA regula-
tions.59 It is assumed, therefore, that the contract remains in force unless and 
until the contractor exercises its right to renounce its rights and terminate 
the contract.60 The sponsoring State could also withdraw its sponsorship, in 
which case the contract would terminate after six months unless the contrac-
tor obtained another sponsor during that time.61 The contractor could also 
request a revision of the contract on the basis that circumstances have arisen, 
which, in the opinion of the contractor, would make it impracticable or im-
possible to achieve the objectives set out in the contract.62 The contractor 
could even relinquish all the area allocated to it under the contract, although 
nothing in the applicable regulations suggests that relinquishment by itself 
extinguishes the terms of the contract.  
Unless and until one of these eventualities arises, the position must be 
that ISA is entitled to consider that the contract remains in force and en-
forceable. It should also be noted that there is no guarantee that Brazil’s 
revised submission will be considered by the CLCS before CPRM’s contract 
with ISA expires in 2030. There is also the question of how the CLCS would 
react if a third State were to challenge Brazil’s assertion of a continental shelf 
entitlement in this area. 
Nevertheless, whether the contract is brought to a premature end or is 
allowed to expire naturally, there remains the question of how to treat con-
fidential data and information transferred to ISA under the contract or re-
quired to be transferred on expiration or termination of the contract.63 In 
principle, such data, generated under contract, belong to the ISA for the 
 
58. Id. 
59. ISA Assembly Decision on Regulations, supra note 10, annex IV, sec. 10. 
60. Note that in such a case, the contractor shall remain liable for all obligations accrued 
prior to the date of such renunciation and those obligations required to be fulfilled after 
termination in accordance with the Regulations. Id. annex IV, sec. 19. 
61. Id. annex IV, sec. 20. 
62. Id. annex IV, sec. 24.1. But note that any such revision requires the consent of both 
ISA and the contractor, so the question arises, what if ISA objects? 











benefit of the international community (subject to the confidentiality provi-
sions of ISA regulations restricting disclosure).  
Considering that Brazil is also a member of the ISA Council, it seems 
likely that this particular issue will be resolved in due course through a con-
sensual arrangement between the sponsoring State, the contractor, and the 
Council. But it is also easy to imagine alternative scenarios that may be more 
difficult to deal with. What if, for example, the contractor, instead of being 
a Brazilian-sponsored state entity, was under effective control of and spon-
sored by another State? And what if that State contested Brazil’s claim to a 
continental shelf over the Rio Grande Rise? In such a case, would a commu-
nication by that State be enough to force the CLCS to refrain from any fur-
ther action, even though the other State is not asserting a rival claim to juris-
diction over the area in question? As we shall see in the case of Oki-
notorishima, discussed below, it seems that such a communication would be 
enough to invoke Annex I of the Rules of Procedure of the CLCS and sus-
pend consideration of the submission. This would hardly be satisfactory 
from Brazil’s point of view but would also leave ISA and the contractor in 
an uncertain situation.  
There is also an important distinction to be drawn between contracts 
issued prior to a submission to the CLCS and applications that may be made 
after a submission has already been made. In the former case, therefore, 
where a contract was issued prior to a submission to the CLCS, ISA would 
surely be bound to continue to respect the terms of the contract for as long 
as it remains in force and pending any recommendation by the CLCS.64 In 
the latter case, it is arguable that ISA should refrain from granting any new 
exploration rights until the CLCS has considered the submission, even 
though this may take a considerable length of time. What is clear is that UN-
CLOS provides no procedure whereby the ISA Council, despite its supervi-
sory responsibility in respect of activities in the Area,65 may challenge a 




The second example concerns the Japanese “island” of Okinotorishima 
(Douglas Reef) in the Pacific Ocean. This is a very small insular feature, con-
sisting of two barren rocks, neither of which is bigger at high tide than a 
 
64. Although the contractor might have great difficulty in raising investment funds if it 
were left in such a position. 











king-size bed,66 lying some 1,740 kilometers (940 nautical miles) south of 
Tokyo. It is Japan’s southernmost possession.67 Upon ratifying UNCLOS in 
June 1996, Japan declared an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles. 
Thereafter Japan deposited charts and lists of geographical coordinates with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 16(2) of 
UNCLOS,68 which included a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone for 
Okinotorishima. In November 2008, Japan made a submission to the CLCS, 
in accordance with Article 76(8) of UNCLOS, covering seven distinct areas 
including the Southern Kyushu-Palau Ridge, which is a natural prolongation 
from the landmass represented by Okinotorishima. 
In response to Japan’s submission, in February 2009, the Republic of 
Korea and China each delivered a note verbale to the Secretary-General ob-
jecting to the Japanese claim to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf for Okinotorishima on the grounds that it did not qual-
ify as an island pursuant to Article 121(3) of UNCLOS and was not capable 
of generating an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.69 China later 
expanded on this claim in May 2009 at the fifteenth session of the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority, where the Chinese representative stated that the 
action taken by Japan was not consistent with UNCLOS as Okinotorishima 
is “only a dozen centimeters above sea-level and less than 10 square meters 
in its original size”70 at high-tide and could not sustain human habitation or 
economic life of its own, as specified in Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. In Au-
gust 2009, China sent a further note verbale to the Secretary-General reiter-
ating its position that the “rock of Okinotorishima does not have any ground 
 
66. Andrew L. Silverstein, Okinotorishima: Artificial Preservation of a Speck of Sovereignty, 16 
BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1990). 
67. F. Shannon Sweeney, Rocks v. Islands: Natural Tensions over Artificial Features in the 
South China Sea, 31 TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 599 (2017). 
68. U.N. Secretary-General, Ref. M.Z.N.61.2008, Deposit by Japan of Charts and Lists of 
Geographical Coordinates of Points, Pursuant to Article 16, Paragraph 2, of the Convention (Mar. 18, 
2008), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ 
mzn_s/mzn61.pdf. 
69. Note Verbale, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations, Ref. No. CML/2/2009 (Feb. 6, 2009), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_ 
new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf; Note Verbale, Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Korea to the United Nations, Ref. No. MUN/046/09 (Feb. 27, 2009), https:// 
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/kor_27feb09.pdf. 
70. Press Release, International Seabed Authority, Seabed Assembly Hears 22 Speakers 
as it Continues Debate on Secretary-General’s Report on Work of the Authority 2, Assem-












to claim a continental shelf” and asking the CLCS not to take any action on 
the part of the Japanese submission covering the Southern Kyushu-Palau 
Ridge.71  
Despite these protestations, the CLCS proceeded to establish a subcom-
mission to consider the Japanese submission. The subcommission adopted 
its recommendations on August 12, 2011, and these were adopted by the 
CLCS, with amendments, on April 19, 2012.72  
Addressing the Southern Kyushu-Palau Ridge Region, the CLCS took 
note of all the communications made by States in relation to the submission, 
including several recent communications concerning Okinotorishima from 
China,73 the Republic of Korea,74 and Japan.75 The CLCS particularly noted 
that China’s note verbale stated that its disagreement with Japan was “in es-
sence, a dispute of whether or not the rock of Oki-no Tori shall have exclu-
sive economic zone or continental shelf, and a dispute of whether relevant 
maritime space is under national jurisdiction or a common space of the in-
ternational community.”76 Korea also stated that “it considers that there ex-
ists a dispute concerning Oki-no-Tori Shima’s legal status.”77  
While these assertions were disputed by Japan, the CLCS decided not 
only that it should not act in relation to the Southern Kyushu-Palau Ridge 
Region but also stated that “it will not be in a position to take action to make 
 
71. Note Verbale, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations, Ref No. CML/31/2009 (Aug. 24, 2009). 
72. COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, SUMMARY OF REC-
OMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN 
REGARD TO THE SUBMISSION MADE BY JAPAN ON 12 NOVEMBER 2008 (2012), 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fi 
n.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINEN-
TAL SHELF].  
73. Note Verbale, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations, Ref. No. CML/25/2012 (Apr. 5, 2012). 
74. Note Verbale, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, 
Ref. No. MUN/174/12 (Apr. 5, 2012). 
75. Note Verbale, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Ref. No. 
PM/12/078 (Apr. 9, 2012). 
76. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL 












recommendations on the Southern Kyushu-Palau Ridge Region until such 
time as the matters referred to in the notes verbales have been resolved.”78  
The situation here differs from that of the Rio Grande Rise in two im-
portant respects. First, there is clearly an objection to the claim by Japan. 
Second, no exploration contract has yet been issued by ISA in the area in 
question. The question that arises is what if a qualified entity were to apply 
for a plan of work for exploration in such an area or (perhaps more likely) 
in an area covered by a pending submission to the CLCS?79 How should ISA 
react? Surprisingly, there is nothing in ISA’s Regulations on Prospecting and 
Exploration in the Area that requires the Legal and Technical Commission 
or the Council to make a positive finding that an application area is actually 
located exclusively in the Area, although that is perhaps implicit in the re-
quirement that the Commission must determine whether an application 
complies with UNCLOS and the Regulations.80 It is also perhaps implicit 
from Article 134 of UNCLOS. One scenario, of course, is that the applicant 
may adjust its application accordingly. In this case, there is no problem. But 
what if the applicant does not wish to make any adjustment, which may in-
dicate that it disputes the coastal State submission? 
The most pragmatic solution, as noted above, is that ISA should refrain 
from granting rights in areas that are subject to a submission to the CLCS, 
including those areas where preliminary information has been submitted. 
While this may not be ideal, especially in the case of disputed areas that may 
not be resolved for a very long time, if ever, it would avoid later legal and 
political problems for ISA and also ensure security of tenure for contractors. 
In the unlikely case, however, that ISA were to issue a contract in a disputed 
 
78. Id. at 5. See also Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Progress of Work 
in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, ¶¶ 20–21, U.N. Doc. CLCS/74 (Apr. 30, 
2012), https://undocs.org/en/clcs/74. 
79. In its decision of June 20, 2008, the Meeting of States Parties decided that States 
parties who were unable to meet the deadline specified in Article 4 of Annex II of UNCLOS 
could submit preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 miles together with the intended date of making a submission in accordance 
with Article 76. Meeting of States Parties, Decision Regarding the Workload of the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Ability of States, Particularly Developing States, to Fulfil the 
Requirements of Article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as Well 
as the Decision Contained in SPLOS/72, Paragraph (a), U.N. Doc. SPLOS/183 (June 20, 2008), 
https://undocs.org/SPLOS/183. 
80. International Seabed Authority, Council, Decision of the Council of the International Sea-
bed Authority Relating to Amendments to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic 
Nodules in the Area and Related Matters, annex, regulations 15, 21(8), ISA Doc. ISBA/19/C/17 











area, despite the language of Article 134(4), UNCLOS does not provide any 
procedure whereby a coastal State may challenge an application for approval 
of a plan of work. It is difficult in any case to see how a challenge could be 
made before the outer limits become final and binding.  
It is conceivable that an aggrieved coastal State could bring a claim 
against the ISA in the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea, pursuant to Article 187(b)(ii) of the Convention 
on the basis that granting a contract for exploration is an act in excess of the 
Authority’s jurisdiction, but this is by no means certain. At the same time, 
should the Council disapprove the contract for exploration, the applicant 
could presumably invoke the Chamber’s jurisdiction under Article 187(d).81 
How the Chamber would deal with such a matter raises further ques-
tions. The Chamber is certainly permitted to decide claims concerning excess 
of jurisdiction, as well as claims that the application of the rules, regulations, 
and procedures of ISA would be in conflict with the obligations of the par-
ties to the dispute under UNCLOS.82 The Chamber might be able to say that 
the outer limits have not been established “on the basis of” the recommen-
dations of the CLCS. But what if the challenge is that provisions of UN-
CLOS have not been properly applied, or that the recommendations of the 
CLCS are based on inadequate or flawed scientific data? And what if the 
objection was raised by ISA? How would the Chamber resolve such a dispute 
without effectively usurping the function of the CLCS, something that IT-




81. Note that in all cases the sponsoring State would have the right to intervene under 
Article 190 of UNCLOS. 
82. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 189. 
83. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 33. In the delimitation of maritime areas be-
tween Canada and France case, the court of arbitration held that it would not be competent 
to determine the outer entitlement to continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles limit 
in the absence of representation of the “international community” and that such community 
was an indispensable party to any such determination, stating, “This Court is not competent 
to carry out a delimitation which affects the rights of a Party which is not before it.” Delim-
itation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (Can. v. Fr.), 21 R.I.I.A. 265, ¶ 79 
(Arb. Trib. 1992), reprinted in 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1145 (1992). The court 
assumed that the international community for this purpose was “represented by organs en-
trusted with the administration and protection of the international sea-bed Area (the sea-
bed beyond national jurisdiction) that has been declared to be the common heritage of man-













The Arctic Ocean and its waters are, like any other ocean, subject to the 
regime of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement.84 The pre-eminence of the 
UNCLOS as the applicable legal framework for the management of the Arc-
tic Ocean was also recognized in the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008.85 Even 
the United States, although not a party to UNCLOS, has agreed with this 
position. This implies that any areas of the seabed beyond national jurisdic-
tion in the Arctic Ocean would be considered part of the Area and subject 
to the legal regime set out in Part XI of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement, 
as well as the rules, regulations, and procedures of the ISA concerning min-
eral exploration and exploitation.86 
How much of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean lies beyond national juris-
diction remains to be seen. All five Arctic coastal States (Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States) assert entitlements 
to continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean extending beyond 200 nautical 
miles.87 Submissions to the CLCS by Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the 
Russian Federation are in various stages of consideration, and no State has 
yet established final and binding outer limits. The United States has gathered 
technical data to substantiate its entitlement to a continental shelf but, as a 
non-party, has not made a submission to the CLCS.  
While all States acknowledge their respective entitlements to continental 
shelves extending beyond 200 nautical miles, there will be various overlap-
ping claims after the delineation of the outer limits that will need to be re-
solved through delimitation.88 For example, one area of 58,850 square miles 
is included in the continental shelf submissions of Canada, Denmark, and 
 
84. Peter Taksøe-Jensen, An International Governance Framework for the Arctic: Challenges for 
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Russia.89 All parties have committed to the orderly settlement of these claims 
on the basis of the Ilulissat Declaration, which recognizes that UNCLOS 
provides the legal framework delineating the outer limits of the continental 
shelf in the Arctic.90 The prevailing view, based on all published sources, is 
that there will be two small areas of seabed remaining beyond national juris-
diction that will form part of the Area.91 Clearly, however, it will be many 
years before the precise boundaries of this part of the Area can be deter-
mined with certainty. 
There are three main legal consequences of the existence of a part of the 
Area in the Arctic Ocean. The first consequence is that any activities of min-
eral exploration and exploitation in the Area in the Arctic must be conducted 
in accordance with Part XI, the 1994 Agreement, and the relevant rules, reg-
ulations, and procedures of ISA. In the event that any mineral resource de-
posits straddle the Area and one or more areas under national jurisdiction, 
such activities would need to be conducted in accordance with Article 142, 
which requires that due regard be paid to the rights and legitimate interests 
of coastal States across whose jurisdiction resource deposits in the Area lie 
and provides a system for consultations and prior consent in such cases. 
While the nature and distribution of mineral resources in the Arctic Ocean 
are not fully understood, it is probably quite unlikely that such resources, 
including hydrocarbon resources, exist beyond the outer limits of the conti-
nental shelves of the Arctic States.92 Nevertheless, the application of Part XI 
is an important point of principle. 
The second consequence, which applies irrespective of the existence of 
a part of the Area, is that Article 82(4) would apply to the exploitation of the 
non-living resources of the continental shelves of the Arctic States—at least 
 
89. See also the very useful map of Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in the Arctic 
Region, with accompanying briefing notes published by the International Boundaries Re-
search Unit, Durham University, United Kingdom. Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in 
the Arctic Region, IBRU, https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/ArcticMaps-
May2020/IBRUArcticmap06-05-20revisedUSAclaimed-compressedpp.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2021). 
90. Ilulissat Declaration supra note 85. 
91. MICHAEL BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 127 (2013). See also 
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those who are parties to UNCLOS—beyond 200 nautical miles. This is dis-
cussed further below, but I have previously suggested that the geographic 
configuration of the Arctic Ocean suggests the need for particularly close 
cooperation between ISA and the Arctic States with respect to the imple-
mentation of Article 82(4).93 
The third, and potentially the most important consequence, is that con-
sideration must be given to the implementation of the provisions of UN-
CLOS relating to marine scientific research in the Area.94 Under Article 256, 
all States, irrespective of their geographical location, and competent interna-
tional organizations have the right, in conformity with the provisions of Part 
XI, to conduct marine scientific research in the Area. Article 143(1) stipulates 
that marine scientific research in the Area is to be carried out exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole. Article 143(2) 
defines the role of the ISA with respect to marine scientific research. It states 
that the ISA may carry out marine scientific research concerning the Area 
and its resources and may enter into contracts for that purpose. Article 
143(3) deals with the position of States parties in relation to marine scientific 
research in the Area and lists a number of ways in which they should fulfill 
their general duty (which is mandatory) to promote international cooperation 
in marine scientific research. This includes participating in international re-
search programs for such purposes and disseminating the results of such 
research and analysis through the ISA. It also includes a requirement to en-
sure that programs are developed through the ISA for the benefit of devel-
oping States and technologically less developed States with a view to 
strengthening their research capabilities and training their personnel. 
Implementation of these provisions has been somewhat limited so far. 
The ISA is not, so far, an observer to the Arctic Council, which is the leading 
intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation in the Arctic.95 This is per-
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haps surprising given that the main functions of the Arctic Council—ensur-
ing the protection of the environment and coordination of “common Arctic 
issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic”96—are fully consistent with ISA’s responsibility to 
ensure the effective protection of the marine environment from the harmful 
effects of deep seabed mining. A positive sign is that in recent years the ISA 
has participated in the work of the Arctic Council’s Working Group on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment.97 This is indicative of the opportu-
nities that exist for strengthening international cooperation in a way that is 
complementary to the implementation of existing instruments and does not 
undermine the role of existing mechanisms. 
 
VI. THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF ARTICLE 82 
 
As a quid pro quo for the reduction by some thirty million square kilometers 
of the geographical extent of the Area caused by the recognition of national 
jurisdiction over the continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles, the 
broad-shelf States had to agree to a system of revenue sharing between 
coastal States and the international community in respect of the exploitation 
of non-living resources of the extended continental shelf. This compromise 
is enshrined in Article 82 of UNCLOS.98  
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Article 82 provides for a system of revenue sharing between coastal 
States and the international community. It provides that payments or contri-
butions in kind are to be made by coastal States in respect of the exploitation 
of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles. Those payments or contributions in kind are to be distributed by the 
ISA to developing States, “particularly the least developed and the land-
locked among them.”99  
The concept of revenue sharing, or the imposition of an international 
royalty, derived from Malta’s Draft Ocean Space Treaty, submitted to the 
Seabed Committee in 1971, which proposed that a coastal State should con-
tribute to the International Ocean Space Institution a percentage of the rev-
enue received from exploitation of living and non-living resources within its 
jurisdiction.100 In the course of the Conference, however, it became clear that 
revenue sharing within 200 nautical miles would not find general agreement, 
despite a number of proposals to that effect.101 A formula for sharing reve-
nue specifically derived from the shelf beyond 200 nautical miles was origi-
nally proposed at the second session of UNCLOS III in 1974. The United 
States suggested it as “a way to reconcile the positions of States which main-
tained that their rights extended to the edge of the continental margin be-
yond 200 miles and those that did not wish to see the common heritage of 
mankind diminished by recognizing coastal State jurisdiction beyond 200 
miles.”102  
Article 82, in its present form, thus represents a compromise between 
various national positions. Coastal States with a continental shelf extending 
beyond 200 nautical miles must make annual payments or contributions in 
kind when exploiting the non-living resources beyond that distance after the 
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first five years of production at a site. The rate of payments or contributions 
will annually rise from 1 percent at the beginning to 7 percent of the value 
or the volume of production at the site as of the twelfth year after the com-
mencement of exploitation.103 A developing State that is a net importer of a 
mineral resource produced from its continental shelf is exempt from making 
such payments or contributions with respect to that resource. Production 
does not, however, include resources used in connection with the exploita-
tion. 
UNCLOS provides little guidance as to how Article 82 might be imple-
mented in practice, and, in comparison to Article 76, very little attention has 
been given to Article 82. The basic idea behind the provision is quite straight-
forward. But even a cursory examination of the text shows that it suffers 
from a lack of precision and raises numerous questions of interpretation. 
Definitions for key terms, such as “value,” “volume,” “site,” “payments,” 
and “contributions in kind” are lacking.104 Some of these terms may be un-
derstood differently in States with a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles. Article 82 has also been characterized as having “textual ambiguities 
and process gaps that can be expected to constrain implementation.”105 It 
has been suggested that the negotiators at UNCLOS III were hesitant to 
suggest too much detail in order not to upset a complicated negotiating pro-
cess. They were also aware they were legislating for an unknown point in 
time in the future and further believed that some issues were better left for 
future implementation.106  
This is a reasonable explanation and characteristic of the sort of com-
promises that are typically reached in complex multilateral negotiations. But 
these difficult issues should not be postponed indefinitely. The fact is that 
with increased scientific knowledge, we can expect more and more discov-
eries of non-living resources on the continental shelf, and we can also expect 
that advances in technology will make exploitation of these resources com-
mercially viable. The interpretation and application of Article 82 raise diffi-
cult questions that need to be further considered and resolved. Applying the 
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lawyer’s adage that “hard cases make bad law,” it would be important to 
reach some common understanding as to how coastal States should ap-
proach the implementation of Article 82 and what should be the role of the 
ISA in its implementation. 
In this respect, while the ISA has a responsibility to develop equitable 
sharing criteria for the distribution of revenue received pursuant to Article 
82, it is much less clear whether the ISA has a role in the implementation of 
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 82. One view is that the Authority has no 
role to play in the process of determining the value or volume of the re-
sources. It is not expected to inquire as to how any payments or contribu-
tions were derived but simply to proceed to make a distribution in accord-
ance with Article 82(4). It is suggested that this is not a reasonable position 
to take.107 At the very least, there needs to be consultation and agreement 
with the ISA so it can discharge its fiduciary duty to mankind as a whole.108  
Until a very late stage in UNCLOS III, language conferring a specific 
role on the ISA appeared in Article 82. For example, in 1975 New Zealand 
suggested that the method of determining value and costs of production 
should be decided by agreement between the ISA and the contributing 
State.109 The drafts of the article that emerged from the Evensen Group in-
cluded a provision that payments and contributions shall be made on terms 
and procedures to be agreed upon with the ISA.110 These proposals and sug-
gestions do not appear in the present language of Article 82. Nevertheless, it 
is surely desirable that there be a common understanding between the ISA 
and its member States as to the basic methodology and procedures for the 
application of Article 82. This may avoid the possibility of any disputes aris-
ing between the ISA and States parties or between States parties as regards 
the calculation of payments.111 
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Since 2009, the ISA Secretariat has convened several workshops and 
commissioned studies aimed at providing guidance for implementing the 
provisions of Article 82.112 Many valuable suggestions were made at these, 
some of which have been taken up, although others languish. In 2016, the 
ISA Secretariat commissioned a comparative study to “help identify possible 
paths for a practical approach” and in developing the understanding of “ter-
minological issues in realistic settings.”113 Nevertheless, States parties have 
shown reluctance to confront the issues associated with Article 82 head-on. 
For example, in the Strategic Plan of the Authority for the period 2019–
2023, the only reference to Article 82 is in connection with the need to de-





It is not suggested that any of the examples cited above have created any 
practical problems so far, nor is it suggested that they will necessarily give 
rise to disputes. The purpose of citing them is to provide illustrations of the 
sort of scenarios that could arise and offer some thoughts on how they may 
be dealt with in a practical sense.  
The long delay in delineating the limits of the continental shelf, and 
hence the extent of the Area, is already problematic. This problem, largely, 
but not exclusively, caused by a serious underestimation of the workload of 
the CLCS and a failure to give it adequate resources, is only exacerbated by 
the fact that disputed claims to the continental shelf are indefinitely sus-
 
files/documents/tstudy4.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 4]. See also Outer Continen-
tal Shelf, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE SEVENTY-THIRD CONFER-
ENCE 1044 (2008). 
112. See, e.g., TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 4, supra note 111; ISA TECHNICAL STUDY: NO. 
12, supra note 104. 
113. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY: NO. 12, supra note 104, at 24. That recommendation was 
fulfilled by INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, A STUDY OF KEY TERMS IN ARTICLE 82 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: TECHNICAL STUDY: 
NO. 15 (2016), https://isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/ts15-web_0.pdf. 
114. International Seabed Authority, Assembly, Decision of the Assembly of the International 
Seabed Authority Relating to the Strategic Plan of the Authority for the Period 2019−2023, ¶ 21, ISA 












pended under the rules of the CLCS. The result is to create a “zone of un-
certainty” in the law of the sea, which was certainly never the intention of 
the drafters of UNCLOS.  
There are many unanswered questions and a lack of clear procedural av-
enues for dealing with some situations. At the same time, the issues raised 
amply demonstrate the interlocking nature of the various parts and provi-
sions of UNCLOS and the wisdom of the negotiators in considering that 
“problems of ocean space are closely related and need to be considered as a 
whole.”115 Regrettably, this preambular exhortation was not fully observed 
in practice since key parts of UNCLOS were negotiated in silos and brought 
together only in the closing phase of UNCLOS III. Evidently, the drafters 
of UNCLOS never felt it necessary to address the problem of a contested 
interface between the Area and the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles.  
The practical impact of this remains to be seen. Nevertheless, as the 
search for mineral deposits intensifies, and as coastal States continue to seek 
to extend their maritime jurisdictions to the maximum extent permitted by 
UNCLOS, the possibility for tension increases. In many ways, the history of 
the law of the sea, starting with the unintended and ill-thought-out conse-
quences of the Truman Declaration, has been one of an erosion of the doc-
trine of the freedom and commonality of the sea towards enclosure.116 This 
is perhaps ironic given that the original impetus for UNCLOS came from 
those nations interested in preserving freedom of navigation against the 
creeping jurisdiction of other States.117 At UNCLOS III the move towards 
enclosure was balanced to some extent by the fears of the global South that 
nothing would be left to them of the common heritage of mankind if they 
did not band together to protect it.118 Translated into international law, how-
ever, the common heritage amounts to not much more than a system of 
voluntary non-appropriation by competing sovereign States119 (with a com-
plementary condition of equal access) and offers no substantive challenge to 
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the traditional customary international law principle, originating in the inter-
ests of States, that the land dominates the sea.120 Procedurally, many will be 
prepared to concede that international recognition of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles will come only with its delineation following rec-
ommendations issued by the CLCS. However, it may be much harder to find 
support for the proposition that, as a matter of principle, the seabed beyond 
200 nautical miles forms part of the common heritage of mankind unless the 
coastal State concerned has proven the contrary through a recommendation 
by the CLCS, even though the latter approach is more consistent with the 
initial conceptions of common heritage advanced in the 1960s. 
With respect to Article 82(4), this has long been regarded as a “back-
burner” issue for the ISA, despite having received considerable attention in 
academic conferences and even by the International Law Association. There 
is a general feeling among the broad-shelf States121 that the issue will be re-
solved in due course when it becomes important. This seems to be compla-
cent. The implementation of Article 82(4) raises difficult and complex legal 
and political questions. The three main issues to be considered are the elab-
oration of equitable sharing criteria pursuant to Article 82(4); the method of 
determination of how and on what basis payments are to be made by coastal 
States; and who shall decide as to their distribution to the international com-
munity. It is important to identify practical solutions to these problems to 
avoid problems before they arise. This will be of particular importance to the 
land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States. 
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